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Abstract—Mobile cloud computing is envisioned as a promising approach to augment computation capabilities of mobile devices for
emerging resource-hungry mobile applications. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic approach for achieving efficient computation
offloading for mobile cloud computing. We formulate the decentralized computation offloading decision making problem among mobile
device users as a decentralized computation offloading game. We analyze the structural property of the game and show that the
game always admits a Nash equilibrium. We then design a decentralized computation offloading mechanism that can achieve a Nash
equilibrium of the game and quantify its efficiency ratio over the centralized optimal solution. Numerical results demonstrate that the
proposed mechanism can achieve efficient computation offloading performance and scale well as the system size increases.
Index Terms—Mobile cloud computing, decentralized computation offloading, game theory.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
As smart-phones are gaining enormous popularity, more
and more new mobile applications such as face recog-
nition, natural language processing, interactive gaming,
and augmented reality are emerging and attract great
attention [1], [2]. This kind of mobile applications are
typically resource-hungry, demanding intensive compu-
tation and high energy consumption. Due to the physical
size constraint, however, mobile devices are in gen-
eral resource-constrained, having limited computation
resources and limited battery life. The tension between
resource-hungry applications and resource-constrained
mobile devices hence poses a significant challenge for
the future mobile platform development [3].
Mobile cloud computing is envisioned as a promising
approach to address such a challenge. As illustrated in
Figure 1, mobile cloud computing can augment the ca-
pabilities of mobile devices for resource-hungry applica-
tions, by offloading the computation via wireless access
to the resource-rich cloud infrastructure such as Ama-
zon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and Windows Azure
Services Platform. In the cloud, each mobile device is
associated with a cloud clone, which runs on a virtual
machine (VM) that can execute mobile applications on
behalf of the mobile device1 [5], [6].
Although the cloud based approach can significantly
augment computation capability of mobile device users,
the task of developing a comprehensive and reliable
mobile cloud computing system remains challenging.
A key challenge is how to achieve an efficient com-
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1. In this study we focus on the mobile application services (e.g.,
remote application execution) of the cloud. However, the cloud can
also provide a number of other services [4], such as platform services
(e.g., storage and file backup services).
Fig. 1. An illustration of mobile cloud computing
putation offloading coordination among mobile device
users. One critical factor of affecting the performance
of mobile cloud computing is the wireless access effi-
ciency [7]. If too many mobile device users choose to
offload the computation to the cloud via wireless access
simultaneously, they may generate severe interference
to each other, which would reduce the data rates for
computation data transmission. This hence can lead to
low energy efficiency for computation offloading and
long data transmission time. In this case, it would not
be beneficial for the mobile device users to offload
computation to the cloud.
In this paper, we adopt a game theoretic approach
to address such a challenge. Game theory is a use-
ful framework for designing decentralized mechanisms,
such that the mobile device users in the system can
self-organize into the mutually satisfactory computa-
tion offloading decisions. The self-organizing feature can
add autonomics into mobile cloud computing system
and help to ease the heavy burden of complex cen-
tralized management (e.g., information collection from
massive mobile device users and computation offloading
scheduling) by the cloud. Moreover, as different mobile
devices are usually owned by different individuals and
they may pursue different interests, game theory is a
powerful tool to analyze the interactions among multi-
ple mobile device users who act in their own interests
and devise incentive compatible computation offloading
mechanisms such that no mobile user has the incentive
to deviate unilaterally.
Specifically, we model the decentralized computation
offloading decision making problem among mobile de-
vice users for mobile cloud computing as a decentralized
computation offloading game. We then propose a de-
centralized computation offloading mechanism that can
achieve the Nash equilibrium of the game. The main
results and contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Decentralized computation offloading game formulation:
We formulate the decentralized computation of-
floading decision making problem among multiple
mobile device users as a decentralized computa-
tion offloading game, by taking into account both
communication and computation aspects of mobile
cloud computing.
• Analysis of game structure: We analyze the decentral-
ized computation offloading game in both homoge-
nous and heterogeneous wireless access cases. For
the homogenous case, we show that the game ad-
mits the beneficial cloud computing group structure,
which guarantees the existence of Nash equilibrium.
For the more general heterogeneous case, we show
that the game is a potential game, and hence admits
the finite improvement property and possesses a
Nash equilibrium.
• Decentralized mechanism for achieving Nash equilib-
rium: We devise a decentralized computation of-
floading mechanism such that mobile device users
make decisions locally, which can significantly re-
duce the controlling and signaling overhead of the
cloud. We show that the mechanism can achieve a
Nash equilibrium of the decentralized computation
offloading game. We further quantify the price of
anarchy, i.e., the efficiency ratio of the mechanism
over the centralized optimal solution. Numerical
results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism
can achieve efficient computation offloading perfor-
mance and scale well as the system size increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
first discuss related work in Section 2, and introduce
the system model in Section 3. We then propose the
decentralized computation offloading game and develop
the decentralized computation offloading mechanism in
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We present the numerical
results in Section 6 and finally conclude in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Most previous work has investigated the efficient com-
putation offloading mechanism design from the per-
spective of a single mobile device user [6]–[9], [9]–[15].
Rudenko et al. in [12] demonstrated by experiments
that significant energy can be saved by computation
offloading. Gonzalo et al. in [13] developed an adaptive
offloading algorithm based on both the execution history
of applications and the current system conditions. Xian
et al. in [14] introduced an efficient timeout scheme for
computation offloading to increase the energy efficiency
on mobile devices. Rahimi et al. in [16] proposed a
2-tier cloud architecture to improve both performance
and scalability of mobile cloud computing. Huang et
al. in [11] proposed a Lyapunov optimization based dy-
namic offloading algorithm to improve the mobile cloud
computing performance while meeting the application
execution time. Barbera et al. in [7] showed by realistic
measurements that the wireless access plays a key role
in affecting the performance of mobile cloud comput-
ing. Wolski et al. in [15] proposed a prediction based
decision making framework for determining when an
offloaded computation will outperform local execution
on the mobile device. Wen et al. in [6] presented an
efficient offloading policy by jointly configuring the clock
frequency in the mobile device and scheduling the data
transmission to minimize the energy consumption.
To the best of our knowledge, only a few works have
addressed the computation offloading problem under
the setting of multiple mobile device users [17]–[19].
Yang et al. in [17] studied the scenario that multiple
users share the wireless network bandwidth, and solved
the problem of maximizing the mobile cloud computing
performance by a centralized heuristic genetic algorithm.
Rahimi et al. in [18] took into consideration user mobility
information and proposed a centralized greedy scheme
to solve the computation offloading problem with mul-
tiple mobile users. Barbarossa et al. in [19] proposed a
centralized scheduling algorithm to jointly optimize the
communication and computation resource allocations
among multiple users with the latency requirements.
The centralized computation offloading schemes above
requires that all the mobile device users submit their
own information (e.g., wireless channel gain and the size
of computation tasks) to a centralized entity (e.g., the
cloud), which will determine the offloading schedule ac-
cordingly. Along a different line, in this paper we adopt
the game theoretic approach and devise a decentralized
mechanism wherein each mobile device user makes the
computation offloading decision locally. This can help
to reduce the controlling and signaling overhead of the
cloud.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the system model of mobile
cloud computing. We consider a set of N = {1, 2, ..., N}
collocated mobile device users and each of which has
a computationally intensive and delay sensitive task
to be completed. There exists a wireless access base-
station s, through which the mobile device users can
offload the computation to the cloud (e.g., Amazon EC2
or Microsoft Azure). Similar to many previous studies
in mobile cloud computing [6], [17], [19] and mobile
networking [20]–[22], to enable tractable analysis and get
useful insights, we consider a quasi-static scenario where
the set of mobile device users N remains unchanged
during a computation offloading period (e.g., within
several seconds), while may change across different pe-
riods2. The general case that mobile users may depart
and leave dynamically within a computation offloading
period will be considered in a future work. Since both
the communication and computation aspects play a key
role in mobile cloud computing, we next introduce the
communication and computation models in details.
3.1 Communication Model
We first introduce the communication model for wireless
access. The wireless access base-station s can be either a
WiFi access point, or a Femtocell network access point
[23], or a macrocell base-station in cellular networks
that manages the uplink/downlink communications of
mobile device users. We denote an ∈ {0, 1} as the
computation offloading decision of mobile device user
n. Specifically, we have an = 1 if user n chooses to
offload the computation to the cloud via wireless access.
We have an = 0 if user n decides to compute its task
locally on the mobile device. Given the decision profile
a = (a1, a2, ..., aN ) of all the mobile device users, we can
compute the uplink data rate for computation offloading
of mobile device user n as [24]
Rn(a) =W log2
(
1 +
PnHn,s
ωn +
∑
m∈N\{n}:am=1
PmHm,s
)
.
(1)
Here W is the channel bandwidth and Pn is user n’s
transmission power which is determined by the wireless
access base-station according to some power control
algorithms such as [25], [26]. Further, Hn,s denotes the
channel gain between the mobile device user n and the
base-station, and ωn = ω
0
n + ω
1
n denotes the background
interference power including the noise power ω0n and the
interference power ω1n from other mobile device users
who carry out wireless transmission but do not involve
in the mobile cloud computing.
From the communication model in (1), we see that
if too many mobile device users choose to offload the
computation via wireless access simultaneously, they
may incur severe interference, leading to low data rates.
As we discuss latter, this would negatively affect the
performance of mobile cloud computing.
3.2 Computation Model
We then introduce the computation model. We consider
that each mobile device user n has a computation task
In , (Bn, Dn) that can be computed either locally on the
mobile device or remotely on the cloud via computation
2. This assumption holds for many applications such as face recogni-
tion and natural language processing, in which the size of computation
input data is not large and hence the computation offloading can be
finished in a smaller time scale (e.g., within several seconds) than the
time scale of users’ mobility.
offloading. Here Bn denotes the size of computation in-
put data (e.g., the program codes and input parameters)
involving in the computation task In and Dn denotes the
total number of CPU cycles required to accomplish the
computation task In. A mobile device user n can apply
the methods in [3], [5], [17] to obtain the information of
Bn and Dn. We next discuss the computation overhead
in terms of both energy consumption and processing
time for both local and cloud computing approaches.
3.2.1 Local Computing
For the local computing approach, a mobile device user
n executes its computation task In locally on the mobile
device. Let F ln be the computation capability (i.e., CPU
cycles per second) of mobile device user n. Here we
allow that different mobile devices may have different
computation capability. The computation execution time
of the task In by local computing is then given as
T ln =
Dn
F ln
. (2)
For the computational energy, we have that
Eln = νnDn, (3)
where νn is the coefficient denoting the consumed en-
ergy per CPU cycle. According to the realistic measure-
ments in [6], [27], we can set νn = 10
−11(F ln)
2.
According to (2) and (3), we can then compute the
overhead of the local computing approach in terms of
computational time and energy as
Z ln = γ
T
n T
l
n + γ
E
n E
l
n, (4)
where 0 ≤ γTn , γ
E
n ≤ 1 denote the weights of com-
putational time and energy for mobile device user n’s
decision making, respectively. To provide rich modeling
flexibility and meet user-specific demands, we allow that
different users can choose different weighting parame-
ters in the decision making. For example, when a user
is at a low battery state, the user would like to put
more weight on energy consumption (i.e., a larger γEn )
in the decision making, in order to save more energy.
When a user is running some application that is sensitive
to the delay (e.g., video streaming), then the user can
put more weight on the processing time (i.e., a larger
γTn ), in order to reduce the delay. Note that the weights
could be dynamic if a user runs different applications or
has different policies/demands at different computation
offloading periods. For ease of exposition, in this paper
we assume that the weights of a user are fixed within one
computation offloading period, while can be changed in
different periods.
3.2.2 Cloud Computing
For the cloud computing approach, a mobile device user
n will offload its computation task In to the cloud and
the cloud will execute the computation task on behalf of
the mobile device user.
For the computation offloading, a mobile device user
n would incur the extra overhead in terms of time and
energy for transmitting the computation input data to
the cloud via wireless access. According to the com-
munication model in Section 3.1, we can compute the
transmission time and energy of mobile device user n
for offloading the input data of size Bn as, respectively,
T cn,off(a) =
Bn
Rn(a)
, (5)
and
Ecn(a) =
PnBn
Rn(a)
. (6)
After the offloading, the cloud will execute the com-
putation task In. Let F cn be the computation capability
(i.e., CPU cycles per second) assigned to user n by the
cloud. The execution time of the task In of mobile device
user n on the cloud can be then given as
T cn,exe =
Dn
F cn
. (7)
According to (5), (6), and (7), we can compute the
overhead of the cloud computing approach in terms of
processing time and energy as
Zcn(a) = γ
T
n
(
T cn,off(a) + T
c
n,exe
)
+ γEn E
c
n(a). (8)
Similar to many studies such as [10]–[14], we neglect
the time overhead for the cloud to send the computation
outcome back to the mobile device user, due to the fact
that for many applications (e.g., face recognition), the
size of the computation outcome in general is much
smaller than the size of computation input data includ-
ing the mobile system settings, program codes and input
parameters.
According to the communication and computation
models above, we see that the computation offloading
decisions a among the mobile device users are cou-
pled. If too many mobile device users simultaneously
choose to offload the computation task to the cloud
via wireless access, they may incur severe interference
and this would lead to a low data rate. When the
data rate Rn(a) of a mobile device user n is low, it
would consume high energy in the wireless access for
offloading the computation input data to cloud and
incur long transmission time as well. In this case, it
would be more beneficial for the user to compute the
task locally on the mobile device to avoid the long
processing time and high energy consumption by the
cloud computing approach. In the following sections,
we will adopt a game theoretic approach to address the
issue of how to achieve efficient computation offloading
decision makings among the mobile device users.
4 DECENTRALIZED COMPUTATION OFFLOAD-
ING GAME
In this section, we develop a game theoretic approach
for achieving efficient computation offloading decision
makings among the mobile device users. The primary
rationale of adopting the game theoretic approach is that
the mobile devices are owned by different individuals
and they may pursue different interests. Game theory
is a powerful framework to analyze the interactions
among multiple mobile device users who act in their
own interests and devise incentive compatible compu-
tation offloading mechanisms such that no user has the
incentive to deviate unilaterally. Moreover, by leveraging
the intelligence of each individual mobile device user,
game theory is a useful tool for devising decentralized
mechanisms with low complexity, such that the users can
self-organize into a mutually satisfactory solution. This
can help to ease the heavy burden of complex centralized
management by the cloud and reduce the controlling and
signaling overhead between the cloud and mobile device
users.
4.1 Game Formulation
We consider the decentralized computation offloading
decision making problem among the mobile device users
within a computation offloading period. Let a−n =
(a1, ..., an−1, an+1, ..., aN ) be computation offloading de-
cisions by all other users except user n. Given other
users’ decisions a−n, user n would like to select a proper
decision an ∈ {0, 1} (i.e., local computing or cloud
computing) to minimize its computation overhead in
terms of energy consumption and processing time, i.e.,
min
an∈{0,1}
Vn(an, a−n), ∀n ∈ N .
According to (4) and (8), we can obtain the overhead
function of mobile device user n as
Vn(an, a−n) =
{
Z ln, if an = 0,
Zcn(a), if an = 1.
(9)
We then formulate the problem above as a strategic
game Γ = (N , {An}n∈N , {Vn}n∈N ), where the set of
mobile device users N is the set of players, An , {0, 1} is
the set of strategies for user n, and the overhead function
Vn(an, a−n) of each user n is the cost function to be
minimized by player n. In the sequel, we call the game
Γ as the decentralized computation offloading game. We
now introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium [28].
Definition 1. A strategy profile a∗ = (a∗1, ..., a
∗
N) is a Nash
equilibrium of the decentralized computation offloading game
if at the equilibrium a∗, no player can further reduce its
overhead by unilaterally changing its strategy, i.e.,
Vn(a
∗
n, a
∗
−n) ≤ Vn(an, a
∗
−n), ∀an ∈ An, n ∈ N . (10)
The Nash equilibrium has the nice self-stability prop-
erty such that the users at the equilibrium can achieve
a mutually satisfactory solution and no user has the
incentive to deviate. This property is very important to
the decentralized computation offloading problem, since
the mobile devices are owned by different individuals
and they may act in their own interests.
4.2 Game Property
We then study the existence of Nash equilibrium of the
decentralized computation offloading game. To proceed,
we first introduce an important concept of best response
[28].
Definition 2. Given the strategies a−n of the other players,
player n’s strategy a∗n ∈ An is a best response if
Vn(a
∗
n, a−n) ≤ Vn(an, a−n), ∀an ∈ An. (11)
According to (10) and (11), we see that at the Nash
equilibrium all the users play the best response strate-
gies towards each other. Based on the concept of best
response, we have the following observation for the
decentralized computation offloading game.
Lemma 1. Given the strategies a−n of other mobile device
users in the decentralized computation offloading game, the
best response of a user n is given as the following threshold
strategy
a∗n =
{
1, if
∑
m∈N\{n}:am=1
PmHm,s ≤ Ln,
0, otherwise,
where the threshold
Ln =
PnHn,s
2
(γTn+γEn Pn)Bn
W(γTn Tln+γEn Eln−γTn Tcn,exe) − 1
− ωn.
The proof is given in Section 8.1 of the separate
supplementary file. According to Lemma 1, we see that
when the received interference
∑
m∈N\{n}:am=1
PmHm,s
is lower enough, it is beneficial for user n to offload the
computation to the cloud. Otherwise, the user n should
compute the task on the mobile device locally. Since
the wireless access plays a critical role in mobile cloud
computing, we next discuss the existence of Nash equi-
librium of the the decentralized computation offloading
game in both homogeneous and heterogeneous wireless
access cases.
4.2.1 Homogeneous Wireless Access Case
We first consider the case that users’ wireless access
is homogenous, i.e., PmHm,s = PnHn,s = K, for any
n,m ∈ N . This can correspond to the scenario that all
the mobile device users experience the similar channel
condition and are assigned with the same transmission
power by the base-station. However, different users may
have different thresholds Ln, i.e., they are heterogeneous
in terms of computation capabilities and tasks.
For the homogenous wireless access case, without loss
of generality, we can order the set N of mobile device
users so that L1
K
≥ L2
K
≥ ... ≥ LN
K
. Based on this, we have
the following useful observation.
Lemma 2. For the decentralized computation offloading game
with homogenous wireless access, if there exists a non-empty
beneficial cloud computing group of mobile device users S ⊆
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for finding beneficial cloud com-
puting group
1: Input: the set of ordered mobile device users with
L1
K
≥ L2
K
≥ ... ≥ LN
K
and L1
K
≥ 0.
2: Output: a beneficial cloud computing group S.
3: set S = {1}.
4: for t = 2 to N do
5: set S˜ = S ∪ {t}
6: if |S˜| > Lt
K
+ 1 then
7: stop and go to return.
8: else set S = S˜.
9: end if
10: end for
11: return S.
N such that
|S| ≤
Li
K
+ 1, ∀i ∈ S, (12)
and further if S ⊂ N ,
|S| >
Lj
K
, ∀j ∈ N\S, (13)
then the strategy profile wherein users i ∈ S play the strategy
ai = 1 and the other users j ∈ N\S play the strategy aj = 0
is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in Section 8.2 of the separate
supplementary file. For example, for a set of 4 users with(
L1
K
, L2
K
, L3
K
, L4
K
)
= (5, 4, 3, 2), the beneficial cloud com-
puting group is S = {1, 2, 3}. In general, when L1
K
≥ 0,
we can construct the beneficial cloud computing group
by using Algorithm 1. Thus, we have the following
result.
Theorem 1. The decentralized computation offloading game
with homogenous wireless access always has a Nash equi-
librium. More specifically, when L1
K
< 0, all users n ∈ N
playing the strategy an = 0 is a Nash equilibrium. When
L1
K
≥ 0, we can construct a beneficial cloud computing group
S 6= ∅ by Algorithm 1 such that the strategy profile wherein
users i ∈ S play the strategy ai = 1 and the other users
j ∈ N\S play the strategy aj = 0 is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in Section 8.3 of the separate sup-
plementary file. Since the computational complexity of
ordering operation (e.g., quicksort algorithm) is typically
O(N logN) and the construction procedure in Algorithm
1 involves at most N operations (with each operation of
the complexity of O(1)), the beneficial cloud computing
group construction algorithm has a low computational
complexity of O(N logN). This implies that we can
compute the Nash equilibrium of the decentralized com-
putation offloading game in the homogenous wireless
access case in a fast manner.
4.2.2 General Wireless Access Case
We next consider the general case including the case
that users’ wireless access can be heterogeneous, i.e.,
PmHm,s 6= PnHn,s. Since mobile device users may have
different transmission power Pn, channel gain Hn,s and
thresholds Ln, the analysis based on the beneficial cloud
computing group in the homogenous case can not apply
here. We hence resort to a power tool of potential game
[29].
Definition 3. A game is called a potential game if it admits
a potential function Φ(a) such that for every n ∈ N , a−n ∈∏
i6=nAi, and a
′
n, an ∈ An, if
Vn(a
′
n, a−n) < Vn(an, a−n), (14)
we have
Φ(a
′
n, a−n) < Φ(an, a−n). (15)
Definition 4. The event where a player n changes to an action
a
′
n from the action an is a better response update if and only
if its cost function is decreased, i.e.,
Vn(a
′
n, a−n) < Vn(an, a−n). (16)
An appealing property of the potential game is that it
admits the finite improvement property, such that any
asynchronous better response update process (i.e., no
more than one player updates the strategy at any given
time) must be finite and leads to a Nash equilibrium [29].
Here the potential function to a game has the same spirit
as the Lyapunov function to a dynamical system. If a
dynamic system is shown to have a Lyapunov function,
then the system has a stable point. Similarly, if a game
admits a potential function, the game must have a Nash
equilibrium.
We now prove the existence of Nash equilibrium of the
general decentralized computation offloading game by
showing that the game is a potential game. Specifically,
we define the potential function as
Φ(a) =
1
2
N∑
n=1
∑
m 6=n
PnHn,sPmHm,sI{an=1}I{am=1}
+
N∑
n=1
PnHn,sLnI{an=0}, (17)
where I{A} is the indicator function such as I{A} = 1 if
the event A is true and I{A} = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2. The general decentralized computation offload-
ing game is a potential game with the potential function as
given in (17), and hence always has a Nash equilibrium and
the finite improvement property.
The proof is given in Section 8.4 of the separate supple-
mentary file. Theorem 2 implies that any asynchronous
better response update process is guaranteed to reach
a Nash equilibrium within a finite number of iterations.
This motivates the algorithm design in following Section
5.
5 DECENTRALIZED COMPUTATION OFFLOAD-
ING MECHANISM
In this section we propose a decentralized computation
offloading mechanism in Algorithm 2 for achieving the
Nash equilibrium of the decentralized computation of-
floading game.
5.1 Mechanism Design
The motivation of using the decentralized computation
offloading mechanism is to coordinate mobile device
users to achieve a mutually satisfactory decision mak-
ing, prior to the computation task execution. The key
idea of the mechanism design is to utilize the finite
improvement property of the decentralized computation
offloading game and let one mobile device user improve
its computation offloading decision at a time. Specifi-
cally, by using the clock signal from the wireless access
base-station for synchronization, we consider a slotted
time structure for the computation offloading decision
update. Each decision slot t consists the following two
parts:
• InterferenceMeasurement: Each mobile device user
n locally measures the received interference µn(t) =∑
m∈N\{n}:am(t)=1
PmHm,s generated by other users
who currently choose the decisions of offloading the
computation tasks to the cloud via wireless access.
To facilitate the interference measurement, for ex-
ample, the users m who choose decisions am(t) = 1
at the current slot will transmit some pilot signals to
the base-station. And each mobile device user can
then enquire its received interference µn(t) from the
base-station.
• Decision Update Contention: We exploit the finite
improvement property of the game by having one
mobile device user carry out a decision update at
each decision slot. We let users who can improve
their computation performance compete for the de-
cision update opportunity in a decentralized man-
ner. More specifically, according to Lemma 1, each
mobile device user n first computes its set of best
response update based on the measured interference
µn(t) as
∆n(t) , {a
∗
n : Vn(a
∗
n, a−n(t)) < Vn(an(t), a−n(t))}
=


{1}, if an(t) = 0 and µn(t) ≤ Ln,
{0}, if an(t) = 1 and µn(t) > Ln,
∅, otherwise.
The best response here is similar to the steepest de-
scent direction selection to reduce user’s overhead.
Then, if ∆n(t) 6= ∅ (i.e., user n can improve), user
n will contend for the decision update opportunity.
Otherwise, user n will not contend and adhere to
the current decision at next decision slot, i.e., an(t+
1) = an(t). For the decision update contention, for
example, we can adopt the random backoff-based
mechanism by setting the time length of decision
update contention as τ∗. Each contending user n
first generates a backoff time value τn according to
the uniform distribution over [0, τ∗] and countdown
until the backoff timer expires. When the timer
expires, if the user has not received any request-
to-update (RTU) message from other mobile device
users yet, the user will update its decision for the
next slot as an(t + 1) ∈ ∆n(t) and then broadcast
a RTU message to all users to indicate that it wins
the decision update contention. For other users, on
hearing the RTU message, they will not update their
decisions and will choose the same decisions at next
slot, i.e., an(t+ 1) = an(t).
According to the finite improvement property in The-
orem 2, the mechanism will converge to a Nash equilib-
rium of the decentralized computation offloading game
within finite number of decision slots. In practice, we
can implement that the computation offloading decision
update process terminates when no RTU messages are
broadcasted for multiple consecutive decision slots (i.e.,
no decision update can be further carried out by any
users). Then each mobile device user n executes the
computation task according to the decision an obtained
at the last decision slot by the mechanism. Due to the
property of Nash equilibrium, no user has the incentive
to deviate from the achieved decisions. This is very
important to the decentralized computation offloading
problem, since the mobile devices are owned by different
individuals and they may act in their own interests.
By following the decentralized computation offloading
mechanism, the users adopt the best response to improve
their decision makings and eventually self-organize into
a mutually satisfactory solution (i.e., Nash equilibrium).
We then analyze the computational complexity of the
algorithm. In each iteration, N mobile users will execute
the operations in Lines 5 − 15. Since the operations
in Lines 5 − 15 only involve some basic arithmetical
calculations, the computational complexity in each it-
eration is O(N). Suppose that it takes C iterations for
the algorithm to converge. Then the total computational
complexity of the algorithm is O(CN). Numerical results
in Section 6 show that the number of iterations C for
convergence increases linearly with the number of users
N . This demonstrates that the decentralized computation
offloading mechanism can converge in a fast manner in
practice.
5.2 Performance Analysis
We then discuss the efficiency of Nash equilibrium by the
decentralized computation offloading mechanism. Note
that the decentralized computation offloading game may
have multiple Nash equilibria, and the proposed de-
centralized computation offloading mechanism will ran-
domly select one Nash equilibrium (since a random user
is chosen for decision update). Following the definition
of price of anarchy (PoA) in game theory [30], we
will quantify the efficiency ratio of the worst-case Nash
Algorithm 2 Decentralized computation offloading
mechanism
1: initialization:
2: each mobile device user n chooses the computation
decision an(0) = 1.
3: end initialization
4: repeat for each user n and each decision slot t in
parallel:
5: measure the interference µn(t).
6: compute the best response set ∆n(t).
7: if ∆n(t) 6= ∅ then
8: contend for the decision update opportunity.
9: if win the decision update contention then
10: choose the decision an(t + 1) ∈ ∆n(t) for
next slot.
11: broadcast the RTU message to other users.
12: else choose the original decision an(t + 1) =
an(t) for next slot.
13: end if
14: else choose the original decision an(t+1) = an(t)
for next slot.
15: end if
16: until no RTU messages are broadcasted for M con-
secutive slots
equilibrium over the centralized optimal solution. Let
Υ be the set of Nash equilibria of the decentralized
computation offloading game. Then the PoA is defined
as
PoA =
maxa∈Υ
∑
n∈N Vn(a)
min
a∈
∏
N
n=1An
∑
n∈N Vn(a)
,
which is lower bounded by 1. A larger PoA implies
that the set of Nash equilibrium is less efficient (in the
worst-case sense) using the centralized optimum as a
benchmark. Let Zcn =
(γTn+γ
E
n Pn)Bn
W log2
(
1+
PnHn,s
ωn
) + γTn T cn,exe. We
can show the following result.
Theorem 3. The PoA of the decentralized computation of-
floading game is at most
∑
N
n=1 Z
l
n∑
N
n=1
min{Zln,Z
c
n}
.
The proof is given in Section 8.5 of the separate
supplementary file. Intuitively, Theorem 3 indicates that
when users have lower cost of local computing (i.e.,
Z ln is smaller), the Nash equilibrium is closer to the
centralized optimum and hence the PoA is lower. More-
over, when the communication efficiency is higher (i.e.,
PnHn,s is larger and hence Zcn is larger), the performance
of Nash equilibrium can be improved. Numerical results
in Section 6 demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium by
the decentralized computation offloading mechanism is
efficient, with at most 10% performance loss, compared
with the centralized optimal solution.
Fig. 2. Dynamics of user cost by the decentralized
computation offloading mechanism
6 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed decentral-
ized computation offloading mechanism by numerical
studies. We first consider the mobile cloud computing
scenario that N = 20 mobile device users are randomly
scattered over a 50m×50m region and the wireless access
base-station is located in the center of the region. For the
wireless access, we set the channel bandwidth W = 5
MHz, the transmission power Pn = 100 mWatts, and
the background noise ωn = −100 dBm. According to
the physical interference model [24], we set the channel
gain Hn,s = d
−α
n,s , where dn,s is the distance between
mobile device user n and the cloudlet and α = 4
is the path loss factor. We set the decision weights
γTn = γ
E
n = 0.5. For the computation task, we use the
face recognition application in [1], where the data size
for the computation offloading Bn = 420 KB and the
total number of CPU cycles Dn = 1000 Megacycles. The
CPU computational capability F ln of a mobile device user
n is randomly assigned from the set {0.5, 0.8, 1.0} GHz
and the computational capability on the cloud F cn = 100
GHz [1].
We first show the dynamics of mobile device users’
computation cost Vn(a) by the proposed decentralized
computation offloading mechanism in Figure 2. We see
that the mechanism can keep mobile users’ cost de-
creasing and converge to an equilibrium. To verify that
the convergent equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, we
further show the dynamics of the potential function
value Φ(a) of the decentralized computation offloading
game in Figure 3. It demonstrates that the proposed
decentralized computation offloading mechanism can
lead the potential function of the game to the minimum
point, which is a Nash equilibrium according to the
property of potential game.
To investigate the impact of computation size on de-
centralized computation offloading, we then implement
the simulations with different number of CPU processing
cycles Dn required for completing the computing task.
Upon comparison, we also implement the local mobile
computing solution such that all the mobile device users
compute their tasks locally on the mobile devices. The
results are shown in Figure 4. We see that the system-
wide computing cost
∑
n∈N Vn(a) by decentralized com-
putation offloading and local mobile computing solu-
tions increases as the number of CPU processing cycles
Dn increases. However, the system-wide computing cost∑
n∈N Vn(a) by decentralized computation offloading
increases much slower than that of local mobile com-
puting. This is because that as the number of CPU
processing cyclesDn increases, more mobile device users
choose to utilize the cloud computing via computation
offloading to mitigate the heavy cost of local computing.
To evaluate the impact of communication data size
on the decentralized computation offloading, we next
implement the simulations with different data size for
computation offloading Bn in Figure 5. We observe
that the system-wide computing cost
∑
n∈N Vn(a) by
decentralized computation offloading as the data size
for computation offloading Bn increases, due to the
fact that a larger data size requires higher overhead
for computation offloading via wireless communication.
Moreover, we see that the system-wide computing cost∑
n∈N Vn(a) by decentralized computation offloading
increases slowly when the data size for computation
offloading Bn is large. This is because that the data
size for computation offloading Bn is large, more mobile
device users choose to compute the tasks locally on
the mobile devices, in order to avoid the heavy cost of
computation offloading via wireless access.
To benchmark the performance of the decentral-
ized computation offloading mechanism, we further
implement the system-wide computing cost mini-
mization solution by centralized optimization, i.e.,
maxa
∑
n∈N Vn(a). Notice that the centralized optimiza-
tion solution requires the complete information of all
mobile device users, such as the details of computing
tasks, the transmission power, the channel gain, and
the CPU frequency of all mobile devices. While the
decentralized computation offloading mechanism only
requires each mobile device user to measure its received
interference and make the decision locally. We run ex-
periments with the number of N = 10, 15, ..., 50 mobile
device users being randomly scattered over the square
area, respectively. We repeat each experiment 100 times
and show the average system-wide computing cost in
Figure 6. We see that the system-wide computing cost
by all the computation offloading solutions increases as
the number of mobile device users N increases. The
proposed incentive compatible computation offloading
solution can reduce up-to 33% and 38% computing
cost over the solutions of all the users choosing the
local computing and choosing the cloud computing, re-
spectively. Compared with the centralized optimization
solution, the performance loss of the decentralized com-
putation offloading mechanism is less than 10% in all
cases. This demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed
decentralized computation offloading mechanism. We
next evaluate the convergence time of the decentralized
computation offloading mechanism. Figure 7 shows that
Fig. 3. Dynamics of potential function
by the decentralized computation of-
floading mechanism
Fig. 4. System-wide computing cost
with different number of CPU pro-
cessing cycles
Fig. 5. System-wide computing cost
with different data size for the compu-
tation offloading
Fig. 6. Average system-wide comput-
ing cost
Fig. 7. Number of iterations by
decentralized computation offloading
mechanism
Fig. 8. Number of controlling and sig-
naling messages by the centralized
optimal and decentralized computa-
tion offloading mechanisms
the average convergence time increases linearly with the
number of mobile device users N . This shows that the
decentralized computation offloading mechanism scales
well with the size of mobile device users. This is critical
since computing the centralized optimal computation of-
floading solution involves solving the integer program-
ming problem (i.e., the decision variables an ∈ {0, 1})
and the computational complexity grows exponentially
as the number of mobile device users N increases.
To evaluate the controlling and signaling overhead
reduction by the decentralized computation offloading
mechanism, we further show the number of controlling
and signaling messages exchanged among the mobile
users and between the users and the cloud in Figure
8. It demonstrates that the decentralized computation
offloading mechanism can reduce the number of con-
trolling and signaling messages by at least 89% over the
centralized optimal computation offloading scheme in
all cases. This is because that for the decentralized com-
putation offloading mechanism, a mobile user would
exchange messages (for interference measurement and
decision update announcement) only when it updates
its computation decision. While for the centralized opti-
mal computation offloading scheme, each mobile user
needs to report all its local parameters to the cloud,
including the transmission power, the channel gain, the
background interference power, the local computation
capability, and many other parameters. Moreover, in
some application scenarios, due to privacy concerns
some mobile users may be sensitive to the revealing of
their local parameters and hence do not have the incen-
tive to participate in the centralized optimal computation
offloading scheme. While the decentralized computation
offloading mechanism does not have this issue since
each mobile user can make the computation offloading
decision locally without exposing its local parameters.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the computation offloading
decision making problem among mobile device users for
mobile cloud computing and propose as a decentralized
computation offloading game formulation. We show that
the game always admits a Nash equilibrium for both
cases of homogenous and heterogenous wireless access.
We also design a decentralized computation offloading
mechanism that can achieve a Nash equilibrium of the
game and further quantify its price of anarchy. Numeri-
cal results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is
efficient and scales well as the system size increases.
For the future work, we are going to consider the more
general case that mobile users may depart and leave
dynamically within a computation offloading period.
In this case, the user mobility patterns might play an
important role in the problem formulation.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
According to (4), (8) and (9), we obtain that
Vn(a) =Z
c
n(a)an + Z
l
n(1− an)
=
(
γTn
(
T cn,off(a) + T
c
n,exe
)
+ γEn E
c
n(a)
)
an
+
(
γTn T
l
n + γ
E
n E
l
n
)
(1− an)
=
((
γTn + γ
E
n Pn
)
Bn
Rn(a)
+ γTn T
c
n,exe
)
an
+
(
γTn T
l
n + γ
E
n E
l
n
)
(1− an).
When user n’s best response a∗n = 1, by Definition 2, we
have that
Vn(1, a
∗
−n) ≤ Vn(0, a
∗
−n),
which implies that(
γTn + γ
E
n Pn
)
Bn
Rn(a)
+ γTn T
c
n,exe ≤ γ
T
n T
l
n + γ
E
n E
l
n.
That is,
Rn(a) ≥
(
γTn + γ
E
n Pn
)
Bn
γTn T
l
n + γ
E
n E
l
n − γ
T
n T
c
n,exe
.
According to (1), we then have that∑
m∈N\{n}:am=1
PmHm,s
≤Ln ,
PnHn,s
2
(γTn+γEn Pn)Bn
W(γTn Tln+γEn Eln−γTn Tcn,exe) − 1
− ωn.
Similarly, we can analyze the case when user n’s best
response a∗n = 0.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
According to (12), for a user i ∈ S, its received interfer-
ence ∑
m∈N\{n}:am=1
PmHm,s = (|S| − 1)K
≤ Li.
Then it follows from Lemma 1 that playing the strategy
ai = 1 is a best response. Similarly, for a user j ∈ N\S,
we can show that playing the strategy aj = 0 is a
best response. Since all the users play the best response
towards each other, the proposed strategy profile is a
Nash equilibrium.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Given the set of ordered mobile device users with L1
K
≥
L2
K
≥ ... ≥ LN
K
, if L1
K
< 0, it is easy to check that the
beneficial cloud computing group S = ∅. In this case,
all users n ∈ N playing the strategy an = 0 is a best
response and hence a Nash equilibrium.
If L1
K
≥ 0, we can construct a beneficial cloud comput-
ing group S 6= ∅ by Algorithm 1. At the first step, we set
S = {1}. It is easy to check that |S| = 1 ≤ L1
K
+ 1, which
satisfies the condition in (12). At the step 2 ≤ t ≤ N , we
define that S˜ = S∪{t}. If |S˜| = t ≤ Lt
K
+1, we then set that
S = S˜ and continue to the next step. If |S˜| = t > Lt
K
+ 1,
we can stop and obtain the beneficial cloud computing
group as S = {1, .., t − 1}. This is because that: 1) S
satisfies that |S| ≤ Lt−1
K
+1 (otherwise we cannot proceed
to the step t), which implies that the condition in (12)
is satisfied, i.e., |S| ≤ Lt−1
K
+ 1 ≤ ... ≤ L1
K
+ 1; 2)
since |S˜| = t > Lt
K
+ 1, we have |S| = t − 1 > Lt
K
,
which implies that the condition in (13) is satisfied, i.e.,
|S| > Lt
K
≥ ... ≥ LN
K
. Note that the total number of
available steps of Algorithm 1 is bounded by N . A
beneficial cloud computing group S 6= ∅ hence must
can be obtained.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
We first show that that Vk(1, a−k) < Vk(0, a−k) implies
Φ(1, a−k) < Φ(0, a−k) for a user k. For this case, ac-
cording to (4), (8) and (9), the condition Vk(1, a−k) <
Vk(0, a−k) implies that∑
m 6=k
PmHm,sI{am=1} < Lk. (18)
Furthermore, according to (17), we know that
Φ(1, a−k)
=
1
2
PkHk,s
∑
m 6=k
PmHm,sI{am=1}
+
1
2
∑
k 6=m
PmHm,sI{am=1}PkHk,s
+
1
2
∑
n6=k
∑
m 6=n,k
PnHn,sPmHm,sI{an=1}I{am=1}
+
∑
n6=k
PnHn,sLnI{an=0},
and
Φ(0, a−k)
=
1
2
∑
n6=k
∑
m 6=n,k
PnHn,sPmHm,sI{an=1}I{am=1}
+PkHk,sLk +
∑
n6=k
PnHn,sLnI{an=0},
which implies that
Φ(1, a−k)− Φ(0, a−k)
=
1
2
PkHk,s
∑
m 6=k
PmHm,sI{am=1}
+
1
2
∑
k 6=m
PmHm,sI{am=1}PkHk,s
−PkHk,sLn
= PkHk,s
∑
m 6=k
PmHm,sI{am=1}
−PkHk,sLk. (19)
Combining (18) and (19), we have that
Φ(1, a−k) < Φ(0, a−k).
Similarly, for the case that Vk(0, a−k) < Vk(1, a−k) for a
user k, we can also show that Φ(0, a−k) < Φ(1, a−k).
8.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Let aˆ ∈ Υ be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium. We must
have that Vn(aˆ) ≤ Z
l
n. Otherwise, if Vn(aˆ) > Z
l
n, the
mobile device user n can always improve by choosing
an = 0 and experiencing a cost of Z
l
n, which contradicts
with the fact that aˆ is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, we have
that
∑
n∈N Vn(aˆ)) ≤
∑N
n=1 Z
l
n.
For an arbitrary computation offloading decision pro-
file a = (an, a−n) ∈
∏N
n=1An, if an = 0, we have
Vn(a) = Z
l
n. If an = 1, we have that
Rn(a) = W log2
(
1 +
PnHn,s
ωn +
∑
m∈N\{n}:am=1
PmHm,s
)
≤W log2
(
1 +
PnHn,s
ωn
)
,
which implies that
Zcn(a) =
(
γTn + γ
E
n Pn
)
Bn
Rn(a)
+ γTn T
c
n,exe
≤
(
γTn + γ
E
n Pn
)
Bn
W log2
(
1 +
PnHn,s
ωn
) + γTn T cn,exe
= Zcn.
Thus, we know that Vn(a) ≥ min{Z ln, Z
c
n} and∑
n∈N Vn(a) ≥
∑N
n=1min{Z
l
n, Z
c
n}. Then it follows that
PoA =
maxa∈Υ
∑
n∈N Vn(a)
min
a∈
∏
N
n=1
An
∑
n∈N Vn(a)
≤
∑N
n=1 Z
l
n∑N
n=1min{Z
l
n, Z
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.
